3.1 The last section considered the structure of the URBAN Programme in Hillfields but perhaps of greater importance is the management process. EKOS (2000) undertook an interim evaluation of the UK URBAN Community Initiative and this section draws on the findings for Coventry Hillfields. In addition, on the ground experience is also incorporated in the analysis.
3.2 Under the second Round of the URBAN Programme, successful Programme bidders were expected to develop an Action Plan outlining the arrangements for the implementation of the Programme in the area. The Coventry Hillfields URBAN Programme Group did this so that funds could be released before the December 1999 deadline.
3.3
Hillfields URBAN Action Plan was scored by EKOS (2000). The Hillfields Action Plan report achieved a
5 star rating –one of three in the evaluation of the 20 URBAN Programmes. In effect the Hillfields URBAN Partnership
Group produced an Action Plan which contained most of the features that a good
plan should possess.
3.4
The UPG had on it an above average representation of the
Community at 46%. It was noted that the
Group originated out of an existing organisation, WATCH. This made easy
recruiting people most of whom were recognised by the City Council or by WATCH.
This process also happened in Swansea and Merseyside.
3.5
The Action Plan was clear in its aims and purposes which made
the implementation process much easier.
However in two aspects, EKOS felt hat the Plan was weak – by not having
a robust exit strategy and being innovative.
In respect of the lack of an innovative approach, this is subjective as
the people of Hillfields felt much of eh URABN Programme activities were
innovative even if hey built up on work done earlier or elsewhere. Programmes can only go as far as people are
willing to let them go. With hindsight
it would have been better had there been an exit strategy established at the
start of the Programme. At the time
it was felt that the URBAN Programme was part of a series of initiatives which
built up on each other so that cumulatively they provided a running programme
of regeneration. Unfortunately the AWM
Regeneration Zone approach and the City Council’s Swanswell planning have come
too late to ensure a continuous programme.
3.6
Overall the UPG felt
that having the URBAN Action Plan was a useful feature which served as a point
of reference. However the development
of the action plan and getting it approved did lead to frustrations as the
process was not smooth faced delays in getting agreement amongst the local
people, the UPG, the Accountable Body (City Council) and the Government
Office. However the Hillfields URBAN
Programme did have team structure early and the plan was approved in July 1999
well before the December 1999 final commitment date.
3.7 The European Commission in its Vademecum on URBAN II Community Initiatives notes that local programmes should have an ex ante evaluation of the programme at the start. The Action Plan aimed at achieving this and help conform to the Vademecum’s requirement that programmes should have a coherence and avoid duplication. In the Hillfields context such a coherency was important in order to ensure that the best value was achieved. Coming after the successful Single Regeneration Budge, the URBAN Programme in Hillfields risked duplication. However this was avoided by the URBAN Partnership Group who ensured that he two were separate but integrated. Many of the URBAN projects were follow-on projects aimed at taking the actions to the next stage. Many of the environmental programmes worked in partnership with the SRB such as the successful Patchwork project or became follow on projects such the Construction Training Project which provided construction training places on SRB related building projects.
3.8 The term capacity building is not clearly defined in the EU Vademecum on URBAN but it does play a major role in many URBAN programmes across Europe. In its initial assessment of the URBAN Initiative, the European Commission noted that URBAN Programmes varied considerably across the EU but many followed Coventry’s approach towards capacity building by tackling social inclusion, entrepreneurship and employment and ICT. Around 33% of Coventry’s Programme went on social inclusion compared to 21% across the EU and 20% on training to approximately 25% across the EU. (It is not always possible to identify all the capacity building training programmes in every Programme).
3.9
The
EKOS (2000) noted that there is a continuous need for capacity building and it
was important to spread out capacity building into the community. The report recognised that without his
approach there was a distinct danger of skills being concentrated in the hands
of a few people. In addition the SRB
management could not take on the additional work involved in the URBAN Programme. This meant that in 1997 at the start of the
project there was a shortage of local people who understood the management
needs of the new Community Initiative in the area.
3.10 Coventry
tends to work in partnership so that means that many organisations and people
link into any process and have an input.
The City has seen noticed a correlation that those people who understand
processes tend to achieve their aspiration for the community. His approach was recognised as good
practice in the in the National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal Annex C
Delivery Organisations for Neighbourhood Management.
3.11 Capacity building has been and is seen as a
crucial important part of community regeneration. It was for this reason two projects – UPG capacity building and
Initiatives Management were the first two projects to be developed. Some 45 organisations and community groups
benefited from these tow projects. Some 20 people benefited from the LIFT
(Local Initiatives Foundation for Training) project aimed at reaching into
isolated communities of interest. In
all some 65 people participated in these three capacity building projects. Their new skills are transferable and to
the longer-term benefit of the community.
3.12 The
training involved Council staff from Regeneration Resources and from Area
Coordination tackling a wide variety of issues including team working, project
development and bidding, financial management and best practice. The
participants on the training courses were encouraged to participate in
networking and members of the UPG went to the UK national conferences organised
by the government. A Hillfields URBAN newspaper helped keep partners informed
of progress. The URBAN Partnership Group was targeted in particular.
3.13 More
importantly the capacity building enabled people to understand why things were
done in particular ways and what needed to be done. This information has spread
into the partnership organisations and a local knowledge base has been
developed It has meant that people on the ground could participate in
decision-making and anticipate what had to be done. In his way a camaraderie
of skills and purpose were established which is a key to successful management
of major Programmes like URBAN
The Role of the URBAN Partnership Group
3.15 This
is reflected in the self-assessment by the UPG on their role. From the results, the Hillfields URBAN
Partnership felt that they played an appropriate role and that the group
encouraged the community to develop projects.
The responses showed that the capacity training and networking were good.
3.16 The
main area where the UPG had difficulty was with the appraisal process. Following Government Office rules and
criteria and the URBAN contact with the Office maintained considerable contact
and gained advice. Although this advice
was passed on, the UPG did not always understand the significance given their
own local agenda.
3.17 The
UPG did not like the formality of the bid questionnaires though they did
appreciate the need for the information.
However, as the local accountable body, the City Council was prepared to
help out in explaining and supporting the UPG in this area.
3.18 In
regard to project monitoring, the UPG felt that it was not really adequately
equipped to deal with the issue. The
City Council played a considerable role in monitoring and ensuring that projects
reports and claims were checked.
The Accountable Body: Coventry City Council
3.19 Like most other URBAN Programmes, the
Hillfields used the local authority as the Accountable Body. In this position Coventry City Council set
out a Service Level Agreement with the Urban Partnership Group so as to ensure
that there was clarity of roles. The
relationship was further helped by the DETR issuing guidance notes detailing
responsibilities, systems procedures etc.
No financial support was provided for the Accountable Body role even
though the role was important in ensuring the success of the URBAN Programme. The
Government Office for the West Midlands with overall responsibility gave helpful
advice and support to the Hillfields Programme
3.20 Coventry
City Council saw that its role as an Accountable body was to ensure that the
URBAN Programme in Hillfields was carried out in line with the rules and
regulations and that the proper reporting structure was observed. In effect, the city Council underwrote the
management system of the Hillfields URBAN Programme. It ensured that the management was proper and coherent. Given the good relations with the URBAN
Partnership Group and partner organisations in general this was, notwithstanding
the usual frustrations, very successful in all but one aspect.
3.21 There
was however one project which highlights the exposure of Accountable Bodies. Under
Measure One
The METO Project:
The METO led project was
led by a National Training Organisation (NTO) for Management and Enterprise. A
company, Inside Track, supporting METO was charged with delivering the project. The project sought to link training
opportunities to entrepreneurs and managers within the Hillfields area. In doing this it sought to increase the
capacity and competence of business and organisations working in the area. Within the project, places for some 110
unemployed people were planned to be provided for those who were interested in
self-employment. However the project
failed.
As is usual, 50% of the
eligible grant was paid up front at the start of the project in January 2000
with a further 30% paid out in June 2000.
The project finished in December 2000.
In order to claim the balance, the project has to be audited. It is at this stage the City Council hears
(informally) that Inside Track has gone into liquidation. The Audit proceeds and the paperwork of the
company and the project have dispersed and attempts to discover the paperwork
were mostly unsuccessful. This means
that the bulk of the claimed expenses cannot be substantiated. As the
Accountable body Coventry City Council is liable for the unsubstantiated grant
claims. At the time of writing the
affair remains unresolved.
3.22 The
METO project does show that the role of being an Accountable Body faces real
issues that are not necessarily within the control of the Partnership or the
Council. Even though a national body is
involved in the bid, there is no surety that the partners delivering the project
are financially viable.
Thorough checks using agencies and Company House records may not expose
frail businesses or businesses which could be operated by fraudulent intent.
Matched Funding and Additionality
3.23 Like most URBAN Programme areas, there was little potential for local funding of projects so locally generated matched funding was virtually non-existent. This is not surprising in areas, such as Hillfields, which have suffered socio-economic decline over long periods.
3.24 The
Single Regeneration Budget was a prime source matched funding providing just 12%
of the total URBAN Programme under £650,000 in projects under Measures 2 and 3. Public
sector agencies including the City Council, the Chamber of Commerce Training and
Enterprise as well as Colleges of Further Education and the University of
Warwick provided over £1,180,000 or 22% of the programme. The
private sector contribution came to £11.4m or 26%. Much of this was in kind or represented in capital inputs for
St Peter’s Community Centre or for environmental improvements.
3.25 Finding
match funded locally generated bids was a difficult exercise. If communities wished to lead projects then
they had to take account of differing time scales, funding regime criteria,
geographical restrictions on uses, complicated application procedures. This meant that negotiating a bid for URBAN
was very difficult and as a result most of the bids were generated from outside
bodies working with local people. There
is a need to greater flexibility in very poor areas for people to gain access to
100% or pre matched funded programmes.
3.26 Hillfields URBAN Programme did provide additional resources and the 34 projects would not have taken place without the additional funding. The next section considers the outputs of the Programme and it is clear that without the 34 URBAN Projects Hillfields would not have developed as strongly and successfully as it has without the capacity building, training, environment and capital works etc.
3.27 The
URBAN Programme in Hillfields worked well in seven areas:
1. Community involvement
2. Partnership working
3. Management structure
4. Clarity of objectives
5. Relationships and commitment
6. Networking and sharing
7. Integration
with other programmes
3.28 There is no doubt that the URBAN Programme in Hillfields (without taking into consideration any outputs from the METO Project) was an undoubted success. It brought the community into the decision making process even though the community had very limited resources. This lack of resources meant that outside bodies were mostly needed to undertake projects but these bodies worked with local people. The EKOS (2000) study survey results in paragraph 3:15 clearly show that he UBRAN Partnership Group felt that this was the case.
3.29
The management structure worked well and this
is reflected in the good relationships and commitment to make the Hillfields
Programme successful. The good
networking and sharing of ideas combined with the capacity building processes
ensured that the partners worked towards the objectives laid out in the Action. This
is clearly seen in the survey response in the EKOS survey. (Paragraph 3:3)
3.30 Of particular help was the continual networking both locally and nationally so that all layers of the management process knew what was going on and what was happening to overcome issues and problems. The good relationships between government office, the City Council, the URBAN Partnership Group and other programmes and schemes operating in Hillfields helped reduce duplication and helped ensure the success. The Area Co-ordination Office located in Hillfields played a key role in ensuring that people were kept on board and informed. This networking enabled people, businesses and other projects operating in the area to understand what was happening.
3.31 The
URBAN Programme was helped by having a clear Action Plan from the beginning
which identified the measures, governance and purposes. This document served as a point of reference
to any one who had queries or doubts. Planning was in effect a key point in the
success of the Programme – it stopped any chance of ‘initiative drift’
which frequently hits programmes once they gain approval.
3.32 The
Hillfields URBAN Programme was tactically linked with the Single Regeneration
Budget and other Council led projects from the start. As noted SRB and URBAN
joined forces to achieve common purposes and provide matching funding. In other areas URBAN projects sought to
complement projects funded from other sources.
In effect, the URBAMN Programme was fully integrated into the overall aim
of regeneration and sought to avoid duplication or rivalry between projects
(with both of which the City Council would have been very unhappy).
What could have worked better?
3.33 The EKOS study found that most programmes in the UK, and this is felt in the Hillfields Project, had four major criticisms:
1. Bureaucracy is a problem
2. Time limits are also an issue
3. Matching funding an issue at the local level
4.
Some groups felt that more could be done - need for a balanced approach
These are not entirely unexpected as no Programme
could satisfy every local need and people are bound to quibble over features of
the Programme. It is the myriad of
rules and regulations which seem to mystify and deter people.
3.34 The Hillfields Project was well managed and well run so the local difficulties were limited to those affecting the programme as a whole in the UK or with project management. The METO Project failure was discovered after the end of the Programme.
3.35 The
main problem was that the projects included in the URBAN Programme were
generated and led by out-of-area bodies.
This often meant hat these bodies identified project opportunities which
did not always accord with local people’s needs and aspirations. This meant that some programmes took time to
take affect and sometimes their approach had to redefined. This is one of the underlying reasons noted
in the EKOS (2000) report for 100% or pre-matched project design.
3.36 Project
development in neighbourhoods such as Hillfields need time develop ideas and get
help for them to mature into bone fide bids. The rush to get the Action Plan out meant that there was too
little time for the local people to develop their own structured bids. Outside bids specifically seeking local
people’s input had to over come a barrier of scepticism and trust. Once these projects, like the Hillfields
Patchwork and Public Art projects, took off they were very successful. However time was always a factor.
3.37 A
degree of frustration was built up by the rules and regulations concerning
Structural Funds. Local issues and
scale of projects do not lend themselves to support from ESF or ERDF. The Special Programming Document (SPD)
which outlines the Structural Funds areas of operation, does not necessarily
accord with deprived neighbourhood socio-economic needs which may be more basic
than envisaged in the SPD. However the
issue is not only restricted to Structural Funds.
3.38 In
Hillfields, the complexity of the rules and the need for matched funding and
often the relatively small scale of potential projects just put people off from
proceeding.
3.39 One
area in which the Hillfields URBAN Programme was weak (and is noted in paragraph
3:5) was in the strategic areas of having a clear exit strategy. The Programme expected that initiatives
would follow towards the programme end and linkages could be established. Unfortunately this was not the case and
successor opportunities came much later than expected.
3.40 In
2001, some ten projects and partnership working were left unfinished or mostly
they needed to continue but were technically unfunded meaning that their
regeneration impact potential was at risk.
The City Council has taken up most of the support expenditure in the very
short term giving time for new funding arrangements to be made. The projects include:
§ Hillfields Public Art Challenge led by Arts Exchange
§ Capacity Building Project led by Osaba
§ Hillfields Marketing Project led by the City Council
§ Hillfields Business Support led by the Chamber of Commerce
§ Hillfields Family Support led by Hillfields Early Years Centre
§ Voluntary and Community support led by LIFT
§ The City Farm Training Project
§ Patchwork Exchange led by Warwickshire Wildlife Trust
§ The Hillfields Sports Development Officer led by he City Council
§
Support for
WATCH initiatives
These continuing projects
have a role to play and for all time limited funding regimes good starts often
have to seek funding at the end or close.
Alternative funding is being sought actively by the City Council and the
organisations concerned. There is a
risk that the longer-term benefits that could accrue from these projects could
easily be lost through lack of continuing funding and a curtailed period of
operation. This is something the UK
government has taken into account with the longer-term New Deal for Communities
programme.
3.41 In January 2002, the Hillfields Partnership submitted an Objective 2 Action Plan for Hillfields. Government Office approved a £1.9m programme – substantially less than that requested. During 2002 resources from the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund were successfully bid for. In effect the regeneration effort started with the Single Regeneration Budget in the mid 1990’s is continuing well into the 2000’s.
Evaluation of the Hillfields URBAN Programme
| Contents & Introduction | 1. The Socio-Economic Background | 2. The Management of the URBAN Programme in Hillfields | 3. Evaluation of the Programme | 4. Outputs and Outcomes | Annexes |